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Prospects for Micro-Insurance in Promoting 
Micro-Credit in Sub-Sahara Africa 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Micro-insurance is part of the growing international micro-finance 
industry that emerged in the 1970s with an estimated potential market in 
less-developed countries of up to four billion policies (Swiss Re, 2010) 1. 
By protecting the consumption patterns of low income groups (i.e., those 
on less than US$4 per day) from the vulnerability of life cycle shocks 
(e.g., death or disability) micro-insurance is increasingly being spouted as 
a ‘self-empowered social protection’ solution to world poverty and a key 
driver for economic growth and entrepreneurial development in 
developing countries (Loewe, 2006; Churchill, 2007; Churchill, Phillips and 
Reinhard, 2011). Specifically, as a risk transfer mechanism, micro-
insurance provides micro-finance institutions (MFIs) and their borrowers 
with ‘contingent collateral’ which enables them to reduce credit risk and 
lower the transaction costs of micro-credit (i.e., small value unsecured 
business loans). Despite the importance of micro-finance and micro-
insurance to the socio-economic development of the world’s poor their 
financial needs are not usually well-served by local institutions and 
markets (Islam and Maitra, 2011). This situation presents financial 
corporations with strategic opportunities for profitable growth and as 
such, warrants more research attention from business and management 
scholars. Indeed, Bruton, Khavel and Chavez (2011, p. 1) acknowledge 
that “. . . selling to the world’s poor may be the last great market frontier 
in international business”. However, despite its evident business and 
development potential, academic management research on micro-
insurance, and in particular, its role in supporting micro-finance initiatives, 
is still very much at an embryonic stage (Churchill et al, 2011). Our study 
thus seeks to fill this knowledge gap. 
In this paper we employ a case study research design focused on 
three major MFIs to examine the prospects for micro-insurance in 
                                                 
1 As Islam and Maitra (2011) make clear, the term micro-finance includes not just micro-
credit (loans) and micro-insurance but also small scale savings and investments, and other 
financial services. 
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promoting micro-credit in the Gambia - a typical less-developed country in 
sub-Sahara Africa. Doz (2011) argues that as case studies can help inform 
our understanding of complex environments they are particularly apt 
research methods for scholars studying business and management issues 
in developing countries. Specifically, we address two research questions in 
the present study: First, what is the most appropriate organizational 
structure to maximize the economic benefits of micro-insurance? Second, 
what are the financial management and wider economic benefits of the 
use of micro-insurance by micro-lenders?  
The first question is important because the effectiveness of micro-
insurance in providing collateral for micro-loans, and ultimately the 
profitability of micro-insurance, will be affected by the ability of MFIs to 
overcome market imperfections arising from information asymmetries 
(adverse selection and moral hazard), and agency conflicts with 
prospective borrowers (Townsend, 1994; Platteau, 1997; Loewe, 2006). 
This will also impact on the profitability of micro-insurance and its future 
market supply. Therefore, how effective organizational structure is in 
controlling information asymmetries and agency problems is an empirical 
question of some importance.  
The second question is related to the first but it has more of a macro-
level public policy focus. For example, if micro-insurance reduces financial 
risk for borrowers and lenders it can stimulate the demand for, as well as 
the supply of, micro-finance. In turn, this can spur self-motivated 
entrepreneurship and economic growth that can have multiplier effects 
across the wider macro-economy. We believe that our case study research 
approach that explicitly accounts for the socio-economic institutional 
conditions underpinning the management of risks and uncertainties faced 
by low income groups in sub-Sahara Africa should help to shed light on 
the foregoing questions.  
Our research protocol is informed by the organizational economics 
literature which provides a well-established conceptual framework for 
explaining observed behaviour in insurance and credit markets, 
particularly in Western developed economies (e.g., see Arrow, 1963; 
Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976). This body of literature explicitly recognizes 
that potential information asymmetry problems (adverse selection and 
moral hazard) and agency incentive conflicts are prevalent in insurance 
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and credit transactions. In this context, organizational structures and 
contracting features emerge to mitigate such problems and ensure that 
markets operate efficiently. However, extant organizational economics 
theory has its limitations. For example, it gives scant attention to such 
issues as the perception, transfer, and sharing of risks in different socio-
cultural contexts such as those based on locality (community), ethnicity 
(tribe), or some other characteristic (e.g., based on gender or religious 
faith). Yet such institutional features typify the business environments of 
less-developed countries such as those of sub-Sahara Africa (Udry, 1994; 
Akotey, Osei and Gemegah, 2011; Giesbart, Steiner and Bendig, 2011). 
Therefore, by considering the effects of such institutional factors on the 
micro-credit/micro-insurance relation our case study approach 
contributes, in a modest way, to the elaboration of theory from the 
‘bottom-up’ (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Doz, 
2011; Welch, Piekkari, Plakoyiannaki, and Paavilainen-Mäntymäki, 2011). 
The insights obtained from our Gambia-based research could also be 
generalized to developing countries elsewhere in sub-Sahara Africa, and 
indeed, other parts of the developing world. Consequently, the study 
could be of interest and relevance to international financiers (e.g., the 
World Bank), aid agencies, governments, and other development 
organizations (Easterly, 2009).   
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides 
background information on the Gambia and motivates the country as the 
institutional setting for our research. Section 3 provides information on the 
theoretical context of the study. Section 4 describes the case study 
methodology employed to address the research questions and section 5 
discusses our findings. Finally, section 6 of the paper draws conclusions 
from our research, identifies its limitations, and considers the potential 
commercial and public policy implications. 
 
2. Institutional Setting 
 
With a geographical area of 4,363 square miles (11,300 square 
kilometres) and a population in 2010 of approximately 1.72 million (90% 
of which is Muslim) the Gambia is the smallest country in sub-Sahara 
Africa (World Bank, 2010). However, the Gambia is deemed to be a good 
institutional environment within which to focus this study as the local 
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economy is a microcosm of sub-Sahara Africa - for example in terms of 
low gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (US$426 in 2010), wide 
national income dispersion (2010 Gini coefficient = 0.47), a relatively 
large and growing balance of trade deficit (-16% of GDP in 2010), and 
heavy economic reliance on the primary sector (e.g., agriculture and 
quarrying) (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
2009; International Monetary Fund, 2010). Demographically, the 
population of the Gambia is made up of four main ethnic groups – 
Mandinka (48% of the population); Fula (18% of the population); Wolof 
(16% of the population); and Jola (10% of the population) with the 
remainder made up of various other races including Arabs and Europeans. 
Easterly and Levine (1997) contend that socio-cultural fragmentation is a 
distinctive feature of less-developed countries in sub-Sahara Africa. They 
aver that this institutional feature could help explain generally low levels 
of local economic development in such low income countries (e.g., 
because ethnic diversity fosters the promotion of sectional socio-political 
interests). Whilst rural communities in the Gambia are distinguished by 
tribal and kinship ties centred on villages, the urban areas (e.g., around 
the capital Banjul) are ethnically mixed.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Table 1 shows that compared with the two main economies of West 
Africa – Ghana and Nigeria – the Gambia has a much lower GDP per 
capita but similar levels of income disparity (as measured by the gini 
coefficient) though interestingly, the Republic of South Africa (RSA) - the 
continent’s most advanced economy - has the largest gini index at 0.58. 
Roughly 60 percent of Gambia’s population subsist on low incomes (≤ US$ 
4 per day) with 36% of the population living in extreme poverty (≤ US$ 2 
per day). Table 1 thus indicates that the Gambia’s current socio-economic 
position is comparable with sub-Sahara Africa as a whole (excluding the 
RSA). Moreover, the levels of national income disparity and poverty for 
the sub-Sahara African countries listed in Table 1 are much higher than 
the Latin American countries of the Dominican Republic and Guatemala 
studied in Bruton et al. (2011) (where gini coefficients were about 0.37 
and with about 40% of the population on low incomes). Such comparative 
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statistics therefore underpin the importance of micro-finance and micro-
insurance initiatives to the economic development of sub-Sahara Africa. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
  
Table 2 gives the key features of the financial services sector in the 
Gambia. Gambia currently has 11 banks of which four are foreign-owned 
(one British and three Nigerian) and one an Islamic bank. Unlike some 
other developing countries (e.g., India), the Gambia (like most other 
countries of sub-Sahara Africa) does not have a public sector insurer 
which subsidizes insurance protection for low income groups. Again, in 
common with other sub-Sahara African countries the rate of insurance 
penetration per capita (measured as annual premiums written as a 
proportion of GDP per head) is only about 1%-2% compared with 15%-
20% in developed economies (Roth, McCord and Liber, 2007; Akotey et 
al., 2011; Giesbart et al., 2011). Additionally, as with other predominantly 
Islamic countries roughly 80%-90% of domestic insurance in the Gambia 
is written on non-life products such as motor vehicle and property 
insurance (e.g., see Abdul Kader, Adams, and Hardwick, 2010). Currently, 
12 local stock-owned insurance companies operate in the domestic market 
including one Islamic (takaful) insurer.  
Currently, 80 (Central Bank licensed) MFIs operate in the Gambia. Of 
this number, 70 or so entities are small savings and credit associations 
(with generally less than 50 members) that operate in rural villages. In 
addition, there are about 10 larger (urban-centered) MFIs that account for 
most micro-loans (90% by value) and micro-savings (75% by value) in 
the Gambia. The three case studies in the present study were drawn from 
this larger group of Gambian MFIs. In most of the MFIs based in the 
Gambia (big and small) a savings record (of at least 1-3years) is normally 
required before micro-credit is given to individuals. Micro-insurance in the 
Gambia is at a very early stage of development and where it does exist, it 
tends to cover micro-borrowers for the value of the outstanding loan in 
the event of death and/or disability. In this regard, the micro-insurance 
market in the Gambia mirrors closely that of the rest of sub-Sahara Africa 
(Swiss Re, 2010). 
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As well as being a typical example of a sub-Sahara African economy, 
the Gambia is also considered to be a good environment within which to 
conduct our research for other reasons. For example, as in other less-
developed countries many small-scale business ventures in the Gambia 
are initiated by women through female business associations (e.g., see 
McPherson, 1996). Insights into the potential of micro-insurance for 
increasing female empowerment in small scale business venture would be 
clearly relevant to local policymakers, international development and aid 
agencies as well as scholars of international business. Additionally, the 
extent to which local community and Islamic influences might 
prospectively influence local micro-lending/micro-insurance buying 
decisions and the subsequent management of risk issues is another 
potentially interesting angle that we investigate in the present study. 
 
3. Theoretical Overview 
 
 This section provides a brief overview of the organizational 
economics literature used to guide and inform our study. 
 
3.1. Information asymmetry problems: Adverse selection and 
moral hazard 
 Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) demonstrated that adverse selection 
is all-pervasive in insurance transactions due to information asymmetries 
between the insurer and the insured at the point-of-sale. As a result, the 
shareholders/managers of insurance companies have to control such 
problems through ex-post monitoring, and the use of costly contractual 
mechanisms such as the use of restrictive covenants, differential risk 
pricing for given levels of indemnity cover, and deductibles (i.e., risk-
sharing mechanisms). In their West African study, Criel, Stuyft and 
Lerberghe (1999) found that adverse selection is a particularly acute 
problem in medical insurance because high risk individuals whose present 
health status can determine their near-future health-care needs (e.g., 
pregnant women or females of child-bearing age) are the ones most likely 
to benefit from, and thus purchase, medical insurance ex-ante. However, 
in his study of local village-based risk management practices in rural India 
Townsend (1994) found that restricting membership of local community 
insurance pools to those within a known pre-defined threshold of 
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acceptable health risk significantly reduced adverse selection problems 
and the associated transaction costs of insurance (e.g., health screening 
expenditures).  
The other common information asymmetry problem in insurance 
markets - moral hazard - arises where the outcome of the insurance 
contract can be influenced by the (unobserved) actions of the insured 
after the insurance policy has been taken out (Arrow, 1963). Again moral 
hazard induces insurers to use contractual mechanisms (e.g., deductibles) 
and engage in costly direct monitoring activities in order to minimize its 
effect on the profitability of their business. However, recent research by 
Paal and Wiseman (2011) reports that in less-developed parts of the 
world, such as rural communities in sub-Sahara Africa, social sanctions 
and close community monitoring can be especially effective in mitigating 
moral hazard problems and reducing the agency costs of contractual 
monitoring and enforcement.  
 
3.2. Information asymmetry, agency problems and organizational 
form 
Mayers and Smith (1981, 1988) argue that in restricting the sale of 
insurance policies to contributors of capital (i.e., by merging the 
customer-owner functions) mutual forms of organization effectively reduce 
agency costs between fixed claimants (policyholders) and residual risk-
bearers (shareholders). This ‘gate-keeper’ function of mutual/cooperative-
type organizational structures gives them competitive advantages in 
insurance markets as it is cost-efficient and effective in controlling 
adverse selection (Smith and Stutzer, 1990, 1995). Smith and Stutzer 
(1990, 1995) also contend that risk-sharing among contributors to the 
mutual insurance pool promotes trust-building and ensures that members 
of the mutual group are motivated to act with due care and attention, and 
integrity ex-post.  Bruton, Ahlstrom and Puky (2009) also report that in 
mutually structured micro-finance situations members are invariably 
bounded by implicit obligations to their fellow members and often incur 
social penalties (e.g., loss of public reputation) if debt covenants are 
contravened even in cases of involuntary lapses such as death and 
disability. Such sanctions can also reduce moral hazard effects on micro-
finance arrangements. Laux and Muermann (2010) add that another 
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potential advantage of the mutual form is that as risk capital is provided 
by policyholders, the free-rider and contractual commitment problems as 
well as the cost of capital can be reduced via bonus-based participatory 
rights insurance contracts that confer policyholders the right to annual and 
terminal surpluses generated by the insurance pool. This attribute 
effectively internalizes the frictional costs of raising capital needed to 
underwrite insurance risks.  
 On the other hand, Mayers and Smith (1981, 1988) acknowledge 
that shareholders of stock insurance companies could be more effective 
than the members of mutual/cooperative organizations in controlling 
market imperfections. For example, majority shareholders can be more 
efficient monitors of agents (managers) activities compared with the more 
disparate customer-owners of mutual funds. Shareholders can also use 
their voting rights to discipline aberrant managers through the annual 
general meeting and ultimately (and probably more likely in developed 
economies), to control the activities of managers through the market for 
corporate control. Therefore, the profitability of mutual/cooperative-type 
of organizations will not necessarily be better than the profitability of 
stock companies. In fact, some recent studies of group risk-sharing 
arrangements in rural communities in less-developed countries (e.g., 
Murgai, Winters, Sadoulet, and de Janvry, 2002) provide evidence that 
rejects the notion that mutual pools are always Pareto-optimal efficient. 
Murgai et al. (2002) report that this could be due to a combination of 
factors such as the inability of mutual group members to effectively 
control adverse selection and cost-efficiently monitor policyholders’ 
behavior once insurance has been purchased, and institutional difficulties 
(e.g., lax property rights legislation) that impede effective contractual 
enforcement. Therefore, the relative effectiveness of organizational form 
in the promotion of micro-finance/micro-insurance is not obvious from the 
literature, and so our case study approach could usefully inform the 
current debate – at least as it applies to developing economies. 
 
3.3. Microinsurance, Microcredit and Poverty Alleviation 
The importance of insurance in economic growth and development 
cannot be over-emphasised. Low income individuals and households 
especially in developing countries face a variety of environmental and lifer 
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cycle hazards, which if not mitigated could severely impact their welfare. 
Several studies (e.g. see Murdoch, 1990; Dercon, Kirchberger, Gunning 
and Platteau, 2008) have shown that the ability of low-income groups to 
rise out of poverty in the long–term is impeded by the substantial welfare 
costs incurred in dealing with unexpected risks and shocks. Some of the 
strategies employed to cope with loss events include selling productive 
assets, informal credit arrangements, and family and mutual support 
networks. However, these strategies have been found to be inefficient, 
insufficient and unreliable especially in the face of covariant shocks which 
systematically affect members of the same community. Murdoch (1999) in 
the study of the risk strategies used by the poor of developing countries 
also noted that informal risk-coping mechanisms only serve as a partial 
protection for low income groups.  
The use of financial instruments such as insurance, flexible savings 
and credit products; and formal social security systems have been 
identified as risk-coping strategies which offer better protection for the 
poor. In particular, micro-insurance could give the poor access to formal 
insurance services and provide a means of coping with the consequences 
of severe economic shocks thereby allowing them to take advantage of 
opportunities that would help escape poverty (Dercon et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, Leftley and Mapfumo (2006) acknowledged that 
microinsurance when used with other financial instruments such as credit, 
savings and other social mechanisms provides an invaluable safety net to 
the low income groups.  
The impact and value derived from the use of micro-insurance by 
low income households have been well documented in literature (see 
Dercon et. al, 2008). For example, in their study of the health schemes in 
Taiwan, Cheng and Chiang (1997) found that universal health insurance 
removed some of the barriers to healthcare for low income households. 
Dror, Koren and Steinberg (2006) also report that micro-insurance 
improves access to hospitalisation and medical consultations for low 
income households in the Philippines. Furthermore, Hamid, Roberts and 
Moseley (2010) in their study of micro-health insurance in Bangladesh 
found that the use of miciro-insurance is positively related to poverty 
indicators such as household income and food sufficiency. They also 
obtained a positive relation for health awareness and utilisation.  
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The majority of previous research on the impact of micro-insurance 
as a risk-coping strategy for low income households is focused micro-
health insurance schemes. This is not surprising as health insurance is the 
most demanded microinsurance product and its impact can be easily 
measured (e.g., through hospital utilisation). Some other studies (e.g., 
Gine, Townsend and Vickery, 2007; Gine and Yang, 2009; Karlan et al., 
2011) also evaluate the uptake and impact of agricultural microinsurance. 
However, very few studies have evaluated the impact of microinsurance 
on microcredit/lending. Chakrabarty (2012) examined the impact of 
credit-life insurance bundled with microcredit loans in Bangladesh and 
found that microcredit when used in conjunction with microinsurance 
reduces the use of child labour for the extremely poor households.  Also, 
Hintz (2010) in the study of the compulsory credit life insurance offered 
by the international German insurer - Allianz - through various MFIs found 
that the use of microinsurance improved financial literacy and helped to 
repay other debts. Therefore, our research complements these prior 
studies on micro-insurance and micro-credit and so contributes to the 
existing development finance literature.  
 
4. Case Study Methodology 
To address our two research questions we used a semi-structured 
interview protocol, informed by the organizational economics literature, to 
interpret the data collected from our field cases. A copy of the interview 
instrument employed is given at Appendix. Baiman (1990) argues that 
applying theory to a research question or problem helps to coordinate and 
sharpen the focus of case inquiry. Yin (2004) also suggests that 
‘purposively’ (as opposed to ‘statistically’) selected case studies such as 
that adopted here can help researchers to sharpen the focus of their 
fieldwork efforts on ‘representative cases’. In turn, such an approach can 
enable researchers to better assess the accuracy of the methodology 
employed and so contribute to theory development and empirical 
investigation. Eisenhardt (1989), Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007), Doz 
(2011), and Welch et al., (2011) further contend that case study design 
can complement and supplement established theory by providing 
‘grounded’ micro-level perspectives. Wright and Copestake (2004) report 
that such attributes can usefully inform commercial and/or public policy 
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decisions. We believe that these intrinsic qualities of case study 
methodology are particularly apt in the present study given the complex 
and emergent nature of micro-finance and micro-insurance in low income 
countries such the Gambia. By focusing on case studies in a single country 
we also to some extent help control for variations in business environment 
that could confound interpretations of field data obtained from different 
jurisdictions.  
 
4.1. Fieldwork  
Site visits and field interviews (of approximately two hours) were 
organized with the assistance of the Gambia Chamber of Commerce and 
conducted on a face-to-face basis with the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
of each MFI. The three selected MFIs are associate members of the local 
Chamber of Commerce and the participants volunteered to participate in 
the interviews and cooperate in the study. Top-tier executives were 
chosen as the principal informants in our study because we sought 
strategic as well as operational insights on micro-credit and micro-
insurance. The principal informants were thus fully knowledgeable about 
all aspects of their business processes and financial activities. Given the 
traditional hierarchical structure of corporate governance and prevalence 
of dominant lead executives on the boards of African companies 
(Wanyama, Burton and Helliar, 2009) the views of the CEOs interviewed 
were taken as being generally reflective of the board as a whole2. 
However, in accordance with local protocol our case study interviews were 
not tape-recorded. 
As in prior micro-finance-based case studies (e.g., Copestake, 
Bhalotra and Johnson, 2001; Bruton et al., 2009, 2011), the basic 
strategy for site selection was to purposefully identify and arrange access 
with representative MFIs of different organizational types that had loan 
books of sufficient scale to warrant management considering offering 
micro-insurance to low income borrowers (see Table 3). During the semi-
structured interview process, the respondents were also invited to express 
                                                 
2 Framing our research design based on this assumption allowed us to get a fairly 
representative organizational view of micro-finance and micro-insurance from a limited 
number (albeit in-depth) field interviews. This was advantageous given the time 
constraints of the study. To some degree it also counters the potential criticism that three 
interviews in three different MFIs is insufficient to fully ground the research project. 
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their views on the key success factors for micro-finance and micro-
insurance (see Table 5). Phrasing interview questions in such an open-
ended manner allowed us to probe deeply the phenomenon under 
investigation and maximize the amount of information obtained from the 
interviewees in the field (Patton, 1990). Additionally, as recommended in 
Yin (2004), the questions were also piloted with senior managers of a 
major Gambian insurance company prior to the formal interviews being 
carried out. The questions were then appropriately refined and revised to 
comply with local protocol and ensure aptness and clarity of the matters 
to be raised during the interviews. Furthermore, to ensure the validity and 
reliability of the information gleaned from the interviews, and so mitigate 
the risk of response bias, the answers recorded for each principal 
informant were re-confirmed at the end of the interview (e.g., see Patton, 
1990). Finally, the qualitative data gathered in the field were subsequently 
analyzed in an iterative manner and constantly cross-referenced to the 
theoretical constructs underpinning our research design in order to 
identify issues that required follow-up and/or clarification (e.g., see 
Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). 
 
4.2. Organizational features 
Table 3 presents the main organizational characteristics of each MFI 
visited in the field, namely: a Gambian (mutual/cooperative) credit union, 
a Gambian-owned bank, and a subsidiary of a foreign (Nigerian)-owned 
bank (that also sells insurance – a so-called ‘bancassurer’).  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
The MFIs given in Table 3 are relatively large micro-finance 
operatives that are based in Gambia’s capital city – Banjul. However, the 
MFIs differ from each other in many key regards such as ownership 
structure, length of operations in the market, international links, and 
knowledge/experience of micro-insurance. The credit union has about 
32,000 savers/borrowers most of whom are members of one of 58 local 
savings-borrowing groups which are organized into six regional credit 
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union associations (referred to locally as ‘chapters’)3. The gender mix of 
credit union membership is approximately 75% male to 25% female with 
at least 50% of members being classed as low income earners mainly 
engaged in the ‘informal’ (or ‘survivalist’) economy (i.e., individuals 
earning less than US4$ per day)4. The Gambian bank had some 150,000 
micro-finance customers and is the largest MFI in the Gambia accounting 
for roughly 25% of micro-savings and micro-lending in the country. The 
Gambian bank also has a portfolio of more wealthy and financially 
sophisticated clients that accounted for most of the annual profits of the 
business. The Nigerian bancassurer was a relatively new entrant in 
Gambia with roughly 20,000 local clients drawn mainly from more affluent 
social groups with only a small percentage of its clients being classed as 
micro-borrowers (again those with an income of less than US$4 per day). 
However, this institution was part of a multinational banking group that 
has longstanding experience of micro-credit and micro-insurance in 
Nigeria and other parts of West Africa.  
 
5. Research Findings 
Our first research question asked: What is the most appropriate 
organizational structure to maximize the economic benefits of micro-
insurance? In addressing this question, we evaluate the organizational 
attributes and procedures that help manage information asymmetry and 
agency problems associated with micro-lending and micro-insurance 
decisions. These attributes are summarized in Table 4. 
 
 [Insert Table 4 here] 
 
                                                 
3Borrower groups in the Gambia, and sub-Sahara Africa generally, usually form around a 
social (e.g., tribal) or sectoral (e.g., agrarian) focal point (Copestake et al., 2001). Ghatak 
and Guinnane (1999) distinguish between different types of borrower groups – those 
groups that are formally and jointly liable in the event of non-compliance with individual 
member’s repayment schedules and those (often smaller borrower groups) where loan 
default by individual members is not jointly liable but rather discouraged by the social 
obligations and sanctions that group membership imposes on individual borrowers. The 
chapters in the Gambian credit union are of the latter kind of borrowing group structure. 
Both forms of borrowing group can help reduce moral hazard effects in micro-financing 
(e.g., through the use of group monitoring and enforcement mechanisms) and so lower 
the probability of loan default or the misuse of borrowed funds. 
 
4 In this study low income earners in the informal economy are defined as individuals who 
are not formally (contractually) employed (e.g., see Akotey et al., 2011). 
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Question 1: Organization-type 
Credit Union  
Consistent with theory (e.g., Smith and Stutzer, 1990, 1995), the 
interview with the principal credit union informant confirmed that the 
organizational structure of the credit union has advantages over the banks 
in the control of information asymmetries and agency problems. For 
example, the social ties and obligations that come with most micro-
borrowers being established savers and members of associated socio-
business groups was identified by the interviewee as a major advantage in 
reducing the potential risks (and costs) of loan delinquency and the 
likelihood of fraudulent and vexatious claims being made under micro-
insurance policies. This view is consistent with the observations of prior 
studies (e.g., Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999; Bruton et al., 2009, 2011) 
which highlight that focusing transactions within ‘club-like’ borrowing 
groups improves the likelihood that individual borrowers will meet their 
financial and moral obligations under micro-credit agreements. Bruton et 
al. (2011) further note that low income earners in developing countries 
are often self-motivated to collectively form borrowing 
groups/associations (e.g., through credit unions) so that they can access a 
cheap source of finance for prospective small-scale business ventures.  
The interview at the credit union highlighted additional economic 
benefits from micro-insurance emanating from the credit union’s control 
over product design and distribution and the reduced need for third party 
commission payments to be made to brokers/agents. The principal 
informant reported that improved risk assessment and risk pricing arising 
from the control of information asymmetries could also provide 
opportunities for the sale of micro-insurance products other than term-life 
insurance covering the period of the loan in force. For example, the 
interviewee stated that: 
 
“. . . the ability of the cooperative structure of the credit union to 
control credit risks could help us to offer micro-insurance for other 
risks such as disability due to health problems or accident for both 
the primary borrower and his/her dependents. . .”. 
 
In their Latin American case studies, Bruton et al. (2011) report that 
one of the major reasons for the failure of borrowers (particularly women) 
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to effectively utilize loans to realize new business opportunities was the 
health risks of dependents rather than themselves. In societies with a 
limited or non-existent welfare state, the proceeds from micro-loans are 
often redirected to pay for medical and other ‘emergency’ expenses rather 
than invest in originally envisaged new projects. Clearly, the extension of 
micro-insurance to cover dependents as well as principal borrowers could 
help improve the entrepreneurial effectiveness and economic impact of 
micro-finance initiatives. This issue is likely to be important for future local 
micro-insurance product-market innovation in sub-Sahara Africa (e.g., see 
also Akotey et al., 2011).  
 In their study of micro-credit in Zambia, Copestake et al. (2001) 
found that rigid group enforcement of fixed micro-loan schedules could 
make some borrowers and/or their dependents worse off if they 
encountered difficulties in repaying loans due to unforeseen personal 
mishap such as death or disability. Micro-insurance could help mitigate 
such loan repayment difficulties for group members facing unanticipated 
life cycle difficulties. Indeed, the credit union executive stated that: 
  
“. . . micro-insurance would be particularly welcomed by our group 
 members and chapters [member associations] as it offers 
 risk protection to borrowers and providing surety as to their future 
 borrowing capability in the event of illness or death.” 
 
The credit union executive further acknowledged that micro-
insurance would enable micro-borrowers to avoid having to pressure other 
chapter members and/or kin to repay the micro-loan of a particular 
individual borrower in the event of his/her death or disability. In this way, 
the principal informant suggested that micro-insurance could play an 
important function in promoting group solidarity and social protection as 
well as providing financial indemnity in the event of death or disability 
even in a Muslim country such as the Gambia5. Micro-insurance written on 
                                                 
5 Conventional life insurance is often deemed by many Muslims to be inconsistent with 
Islamic principles – for example, it could be viewed as ‘gambling on life’ (Abdul Kader et 
al., 2010).  On the other hand, the case study interview at the credit union plus 
subsequent discussions with members of the Gambian Chamber of Commerce indicated 
that “loan forgiveness” in the event of death or severe disability of the primary borrower is 
an integral part of the Islamic faith as it relieves dependents from the moral and financial 
burden, and spiritual obligation to repay outstanding loans. Hence, micro-insurance could 
actually be consistent with Islamic principles. MFI respondents recognized this issue as 
being of potential benefit in marketing micro-insurance products in the Gambia – a secular 
country but one with a predominantly Muslim population. 
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a borrower-group (chapter) basis (i.e., with all members covered by a 
single insurance policy) could also help reduce underwriting costs (adverse 
selection) and lower premium rates for group members.  
Protection against involuntary loan default provided by micro-
insurance would also help the credit union reduce its loan loss provisions 
(currently the major liability item in the credit union’s balance sheet) and 
so promote period profitability, encourage further lending, and enhance its 
ability to attract new business. Indeed, the principal informant at the 
credit union felt that prospective improvements in financial condition 
induced by the indemnity benefits of micro-insurance would allow the 
credit union to realize synergy gains from lower loan delinquency rates, 
reduced rates of interest, and higher savings deposits rates. The credit 
union could also utilize insurance funds to finance expansion of the micro-
credit business and allow micro-loans to have more flexible design 
features (e.g., to cater for income volatility of the borrower). As the 
interviewee said: 
 
“. . . micro-insurance could have a significant positive effect on our 
annual financial performance and strengthen our balance sheet. 
This would enable us to expand our loan book and increase 
business volumes thereby enabling us to realize the benefits of 
economies of scale and increase the range of financial products and 
services that we offer to our members . . .”.  
 
What is more, the respondent perceived that new members could be 
encouraged to join the credit union as the result of micro-insurance 
mitigating credit and insolvency risks for the organization. These 
attributes could enable the credit union to grow its business through the 
realization of economies of scale (increased volumes) and economies of 
scope (product diversification). Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) suggest that 
such micro-economic advantages could realize tangible competitive gains 
for MFIs operating in developing countries. It would also have the 
advantage of increasing the local market supply of micro-credit and micro-
insurance protection for low income groups. 
 
Gambian-owned Bank 
The Gambian-owned bank is an established and prominent local MFI 
with informal links to financial institutions in Europe (via the Managing 
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Director’s personal business networks). As a stock company, the Gambian 
bank’s loan portfolio is backed by shareholders’ equity as well as 
subordinated debt and accumulated reserves. However, 75% of annual 
profits come from conventional banking activities with local companies 
and ‘high net worth’ private individuals. The organization is larger, more 
diversified, and financially stronger than the credit union. Surprisingly, 
both conventional loan and micro-credit-backed term life/disability 
insurance did not exist to any significant degree at the bank due to a 
general lack of in-house insurance knowledge plus some doubt amongst 
senior bank management as to its compatibility with Islamic principles 
(see footnote 4). However, the prospects of insurance providing collateral 
for the bank’s conventional and micro-finance business were deemed to 
be very good and important by the senior executive interviewed: 
 
“ . . . insurance generally, and micro-insurance in particular, are 
 currently of great interest to the bank as it will help improve 
 profitability, promote solvency, and protect shareholders’ interests. 
 These are things that are important not only to us but others such 
 as regulators (like the Central Bank), auditors and the government. 
 We are currently obtaining advice from a major Dutch insurance 
 corporation on the prospects for term micro-life insurance to 
 protect our micro-credit book . . . “. 
 
Despite the potential benefits of greater financial strength, a 
diversified business portfolio, and a well-established local market 
presence, the principal informant at the Gambian bank noted potential 
operational difficulties in addition to lack of knowledge/expertise on micro-
insurance. For example, loan default risk was a major issue on the micro-
credit side of the business suggesting potentially acute problems of 
adverse selection and moral hazard. The usual absence of loan collateral 
in micro-finance arrangements thus means that the ability of the local 
bank to indemnify itself against the risk of severe default losses is virtually 
non-existent without micro-insurance. Indeed, the bank executive 
interviewed acknowledged that: 
 
“  . . . it is difficult to identify the creditworthiness of customers – 
 particularly new customers – given that economic circumstances [in 
 the Gambia] have changed recently following the global financial 
 crisis . . . This has hindered our lending expansion plans in a big 
 way .” 
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This respondent further suggested that unlike their counterparts in 
developed Western economies, locally-owned banks in sub-Sahara Africa 
are in practice not efficiently diversified. Additionally, compared with the 
credit union, information asymmetry problems at the local bank are 
potentially more acute because the bank focuses its lending activities on 
individuals with limited and/or uncertain credit history rather than through 
self-monitored and mutually-dependent borrower groups (e.g., see 
Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999). Furthermore, the inherently weaker 
structural controls of information asymmetry and agency problems 
inherent in stock forms of organization (such as the Gambian bank) are 
potentially major inhibitors on the effectiveness of micro-insurance in 
reducing the risk of debt default and associated agency costs. Additionally, 
selling micro-insurance to disparate individuals either directly or through 
third party agents/brokers, is likely to be less cost-efficient/effective than 
directly distributing micro-insurance through the mutual group structure 
of the credit union (Loewe, 2006). This limitation is expected to further 
increase the costs of micro-insurance for the Gambian bank compared 
with its local credit union competitor.  
 
Foreign-owned Bancassurer 
 The key economic advantage of the foreign (Nigerian) bancassurer 
MFI is that it is part of a larger organization that has business experience 
of managing micro-risk transfer pools in other West African markets. This 
knowledge and experience can encourage product-market innovation and 
enable technology (e.g., actuarial) to be used in the risk assessment and 
pricing of micro-finance and micro-insurance arrangements (e.g., see 
Loewe, 2006; Churchill, 2007). On the other hand, the foreign-owned 
bancassurer has major economic disadvantages compared with its local 
credit union and bank rivals. Despite the advantage of in-corporate risk 
management knowledge and expertise, information asymmetry and 
agency problems are likely to be severe due to the foreign bancassurer’s 
relative lack of local market knowledge. The interviewee at the 
bancassurer acknowledged that: 
  
 “. . . getting to know the nature and opportunities of the local 
 Gambian market – the social nuances and cultural aspects – is a 
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 major challenge that will require considerable investment in market 
 research . . . “. 
 
 Copestake et al. (2001, p. 92) also recognize the importance of 
market research for MFIs and the expediency of “. . . highlighting the 
need for innovation based on systematic product development rather than 
uncritical replication of models developed in other contexts.” In addition, 
Loewe (2006) contends that commercial entities, such as the subsidiaries 
of foreign-owned banks, are often too distant in socio-cultural and spatial 
terms from targeted micro-insurance customers. This limitation can hinder 
customer confidence and inhibit the demand for micro-insurance amongst 
low income earners. Such structural organizational deficiencies with this 
foreign-owned MFI clearly exacerbate the information asymmetry and 
agency problems that it faces in the Gambian micro-credit and micro-
insurance markets. The limited local networks held by the foreign-owned 
bank further means that insurance brokers/agents will have to be 
employed to distribute and sell micro-insurance products thereby adding 
to operating costs. 
 
Evaluation 
 Our case study evidence suggests that the credit union-type 
structure is likely to be the most appropriate (i.e., economical, efficient 
and effective) distribution and servicing platform for micro-insurance in 
sub-Saharan countries such as the Gambia. Whilst credit unions could use 
the collateral qualities of micro-insurance to improve their  annual 
profitability (e.g., by lowering loan loss provisions and increasing volumes 
of micro-loans) they would nonetheless warrant partnering with an 
insurance company or some other financial institution to provide a 
sufficient level of financial scale, risk diversification, as well as the 
requisite degree of product-market knowledge, managerial expertise and 
infra-structural support (e.g., with regard to actuarial technology). In 
particular, the importance of scale and risk diversification efficiency in 
complementing organizational form in promoting the micro-insurance 
aspects of micro-finance arrangements appears to be a key issue in less-
developed countries such as the Gambia. However, this aspect has not 
been given sufficient emphasis in the international business literature. 
Based on the above findings we therefore propose: 
 20 
 
 
 
Proposition 1: The financial success of micro-insurance in providing 
collateral for micro-credit will be conjointly driven by the 
mutual/cooperative form of organization, firm size and the ability to 
efficiently diversify assumed risks. 
 
 In addition, the importance of local knowledge and established trust 
relationships irrespective of the scale and structure of the organization 
was stressed in our case findings. Whist recognized in prior research (e.g., 
Giesbart et al., 2011), this observation nevertheless reinforces the 
importance of local customer management as well as product-market 
knowledge in promoting micro-credit and micro-insurance in less-
developed countries. Therefore:  
 Proposition 2: The financial success of micro-insurance in providing 
 collateral for micro-credit will be driven by customer as well as 
 product-market knowledge. 
 
 These two propositions (together with propositions 3 and 4 later on) 
and their linked with micro-credit and micro-insurance outcomes are 
summarized in a schematic fashion in the figure below. 
 
[Insert Figure here] 
 
Question 2: Wider Socio-Economic Benefits  
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Table 5 presents the views of the case informants as to the important 
features of micro-finance and micro-insurance products that help to 
attract consumer demand and promote long-term economic development. 
Consistent with prior international development studies (e.g., Loewe, 
2006), in all cases the principal informants emphasized the need for 
simple product design and effective distribution with sustained profitability 
– particularly in MFIs with joint-stock ownership where  annual returns in 
excess of the cost of capital are necessary to satisfy shareholders. It was 
generally recognized by the respondents interviewed that sustained 
profitability in the micro-finance/micro-insurance sector was conditional 
upon achieving large volumes of business (economies of scale) and 
opportunities for cross-selling (economies of scope). As noted in prior 
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studies conducted in sub-Sahara Africa (e.g., Copestake et al., 2001; 
Giesbart et al., 2011), these requirements would require an appropriate 
level of product innovation based on extensive local market research. The 
lack of in-house product-market and technical (e.g., actuarial) knowledge 
was deemed by all the interviewees to be a potentially important 
impediment to successful commercial performance in the local micro-
finance/micro-insurance sector. Indeed, a major issue raised by the 
interviewees with regard to the profitability of micro-finance/micro-
insurance schemes was estimating and pricing the financial (default) risk 
and insurable risk of loss. This includes effectively assessing and 
managing adverse selection and moral hazard problems (including the risk 
of fraud). However, these potential limitations could be alleviated by 
accessing overseas knowledge and expertise of micro-insurance either 
from head office or in partnership with an informed local or international 
financial institution.  
The case study evidence also highlighted the relatively more severe 
problems of accurately estimating the future profitability of financing 
arrangements amongst communities in rural compared with urban areas 
due to increased problems of risk assessment, monitoring and control 
across geographical spaces. This observation is consistent with the 
findings of recent studies conducted elsewhere in West Africa (e.g., the 
Ghana-based study of Akotey et al. 2011). It further suggests that 
sustained profitability of micro-finance and micro-insurance schemes in 
developing countries such as Gambia could be influenced by distributional 
aspects such as a focus on rural versus urban location and/or tribal 
group/community. For example in the Gambia, rural village communities 
tend to be characterized by homogeneous tribal and kinship groups 
whereas the urban areas tend to be more ethnically mixed and diverse in 
terms of educational standards and income levels. 
The geography of micro-credit and micro-insurance product 
distribution is also linked closely with other socio-cultural attributes such 
as gender and religious affiliation. For instance, in rural parts of the 
Gambia many micro-borrowers are women who borrow to either establish 
small ventures (e.g., a market stall) and/or cooperatives (e.g., with a 
focus on crafts or agricultural products). All principal informants noted the 
relatively lower mortality risk for females of given age cohorts compared 
 22 
 
 
with their male counterparts6. The principal informant from the credit 
union also indicated that females tended to have lower rates of loan 
default than males. This observation has been identified in prior research 
(e.g., Bruton et al., 2011) and raises the possibility that the profitability of 
micro-insurance could be gender-related as well as location driven7. 
Interestingly, the case study evidence gleaned from the credit union case 
study suggested the strong Islamic influence, particularly in more 
conservative rural areas could actually enhance the prospects of selling 
micro-insurance on the back of micro-loans as it relieves dependents of 
the financial burden in the event of the untimely death of the principal 
borrower (see also footnote 4). This finding tends to contradict some prior 
studies (e.g., Abdul Kader et al., 2010) and indeed, the pre-conceptions of 
the principal informant at the Gambian bank, that life insurance products 
are less attractive in Islamic communities because of their commonly 
perceived inconsistency with religious belief. 
 
Evaluation 
 
In terms of the prospective wider socio-economic benefits of micro-
insurance for micro-lending, scale and local product-market knowledge 
were again found to be important considerations in our case studies. 
However, geographical and associated socio-cultural aspects (e.g., 
gender) also appear to be important in the micro-credit and micro-
insurance business in the Gambia. Consequently, we propose: 
 
                                                 
6 Table 1 (footnote 4) gives the average female to male life expectancy in the Gambia to 
be around 58 years compared with 54 years. However, this rate will vary between urban 
and rural communities with urban life expectancy being higher due to conditions such as 
the relatively better social infrastructure and higher per capita incomes in towns and cities. 
 
7 At the time of the interview the reason(s) for the perceived better micro-loan 
performance rate for females compared with males was not immediately obvious to the 
principal informant at the credit union. However, it is possible that because women tend to 
have fewer economic opportunities than men in less-developed (particularly Islamic) 
countries they compensate for this with a greater determination for their business 
initiatives to succeed and thus enable them to continue loan repayments. It is also possible 
that socio-cultural factors in sub-Sahara African countries, such as the stigma associated 
with loan default and the public reputational implications that this could have for other 
family members (especially dependent children), could be given more psychological weight 
by women compared with men. We agree with Bruton et al. (2011, p. 17) who consider 
that gender differences in micro-loan performance warrants further theoretical and 
empirical research by international business scholars.  
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 Proposition 3: The wider socio-economic benefits of micro-insurance 
 in promoting micro-credit will be influenced by geographical 
 distribution and gender considerations. 
 
 Additionally, contrary to orthodox views expressed in some prior 
research (e.g., Abdul Kader et al., 2010) the Islamic faith may actually 
promote rather than impede the growth of micro-insurance in backing 
micro-loans, at least in secular Muslim societies such as the Gambia. 
Therefore, we propose that: 
 
Proposition 4: The wider socio-economic benefits of micro-insurance 
in promoting micro-credit will be driven, and not impeded by, the 
principals of Islamic faith. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 Drawing a framework from the organizational economics literature 
and utilizing case study methodology this study examines the role of 
micro-insurance in supporting micro-finance initiatives in the Gambia. The 
Gambia reflects many of the salient institutional attributes of low income 
countries in sub-Sahara Africa and as such, the results of our study can be 
generalized to other developing countries in Africa and elsewhere.  
 In terms of our first research question, a key finding that emerges 
from our research is that whilst stock-owned banks are able to efficiently 
diversify the high risks of micro-credit across shareholders’ funds as well 
as subordinated debt and accumulated reserves, and draw on risk 
management expertise they are relatively more inhibited by information 
asymmetry and agency problems than mutual-cooperative–type 
organizations such as credit unions. In the local credit union, adverse 
selection is controlled by fixed pre-specified savings requirements and 
precautionary managerial assessment of prospective borrowers’ 
creditworthiness and financial reliability. The social ties, obligations, and 
sanctions within borrower groups (chapters) associated with the credit 
union further help to minimize moral hazard even in cases of involuntary 
default. These are important advantages in the provision and distribution 
of micro-finance and micro-insurance in highly asymmetric markets such 
as those in less-developed countries. Hence, in addressing our first 
research question we argue that the credit union is likely to be the most 
appropriate organization for profitable and effective micro-finance and 
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micro-insurance initiatives in developing countries such as the Gambia. 
However, a new theoretical and empirical slant arising from our research 
is that the mutual/cooperative form of organization will also need to have 
sufficient size (scale) and diversity to efficiently manage risks and realize 
sustainable profits. Additionally, important is the requirement for MFIs 
(and their business partners) to be aware of local customer needs as well 
as product-market knowledge in order to effectively assess and price risk, 
and develop appropriately flexible and innovative micro-credit and micro-
insurance products. 
  In relation to our second research question, it is evident from our 
case study research that by offering collateral for micro-credit and 
providing indemnity cover in the event of some severe loss event such as 
death or disability to the primary borrower micro-insurance is clearly a 
potentially important mechanism for promoting entrepreneurial 
development and sustained economic growth in less-developed countries. 
Therefore, the results of our study could have important commercial and 
public policy implications. For example, by mitigating risk and uncertainty 
in emergent markets, micro-insurance is a potential market-based 
solution to social and economic hardship that can promote self-help 
initiatives thereby reducing reliance on government support and 
international aid. This is particularly pertinent in developing countries of 
sub-Sahara Africa (such as the Gambia) that have a limited welfare state 
and no public sector subsidized micro-insurance capacity. Geographical, 
gender and other socio-cultural (e.g., religious) issues are also likely to be 
important considerations in terms of the future role of micro-insurance in 
the development of the wider market for micro-finance in sub-Sahara 
Africa. 
 We acknowledge that our research is subject to inherent limitations 
such as the focus on three interviews in three different types of MFI 
organization while excluding other structural forms of organization such as 
government-owned/sponsored organizations. Nonetheless, the 
organizational characteristics of the three cases examined in the present 
study are representative of most MFIs in developing countries. Given the 
prevalent hierarchical nature of corporate systems in sub-Sahara Africa 
the views of the interviewees are also deemed to reflect those of other 
board members. Nonetheless, we acknowledge that the conclusions from 
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our research may need to be tempered in line with these inherent 
limitations with the research approach adopted. Finally, we consider that 
the role of micro-insurance in facilitating micro-finance and promoting 
sustainable economic growth in developing countries could benefit from 
more empirical research. For example, future international business 
research could investigate the determinants of the profitability of micro-
insurance schemes, the macro-economic multiplier effects of micro-
insurance in less-developed countries, and the impact of micro-insurance 
on the performance of micro-loans at the country, firm, and person-
specific (e.g., gender) levels of analysis.  
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Appendix:  Micro-Credit and Micro-Insurance in the Gambia 
 
Field Interview Instrument 
 
I. Basic Details: 
 
Organization: ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 
Form: ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Nationality of ownership: ………………………………………………………………………… 
Interviewee: …………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Position: ……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
Date interviewed: …………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
II. Opening questions: 
 
 What does your job entail? 
 Explain what you understand to be micro-credit and micro-
insurance? 
 Does your organization sell/distribute micro-credit and micro-
insurance products? 
 If so, please give details of: 
-annual value of loans 
- annual value of premiums 
- number and type of loans 
- number and type of policies 
 When did first sell micro-credit and micro-insurance products? 
 What do you think are your organization’s unique selling proposition 
in micro-credit and micro-insurance? 
 What difficulties do you feel exist in selling micro-credit and micro-
insurance products? 
 
III. Influences on Micro-Lending and Micro-Insurance: 
 
 What are the important product-market considerations for micro-
credit and micro-insurance in terms of: 
 
- Design 
- Risk Assessment 
- Distribution 
- Repayment 
- Purpose 
- Administrative support 
- Governance and control 
- Profitability 
- Market opportunities/trends 
 
 How do you feel the following aspects of micro-credit and micro-
insurance are low, medium or high risk to your organization: 
 
- Seeking new business?  Reason? 
- Risk screening? Reason? 
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- Risk assessment? Reason? 
- Risk pricing? Reason 
- Contract servicing? Reason 
- Contract monitoring? Reason 
- Contract enforcement? Reason 
- Financial default? Reason? 
- Audit and (fraud) control? Reason? 
 
 
 Do you believe that micro-insurance is/will usefully complement 
your micro-credit business? 
- If Yes, please explain 
- If No, please explain 
 
 
 What do you consider to be the main issues that will: (a) encourage 
the growth of micro-credit and micro-insurance; and (b) impede the 
growth of micro-credit and micro-insurance? Please give reasons. 
 
 Are there any other points regarding the prospects for micro-credit 
and micro-insurance in Gambia and sub-Sahara Africa that you 
would like to raise? Please give reasons. 
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               Table 1:         Gambia and Selected Sub-Saharan African Countries – Key Economic Indicators (2009/10) 
                    This table presents some key economic indicators for the Gambia and three major Sub-Saharan African countries namely Ghana, Nigeria and the 
  Republic of South Africa (RSA) for 2009/10. To facilitate comparison, indicator details are also  provided for Sub Saharan Africa as  a whole.  
                                                               COUNTRY     
 
Indicator 
 
  Gambia 
 
   Ghana 
   
  Nigeria 
     
       RSA 
Sub-Saharan   Africa  
(excluding RSA) 
Population (millions)     1.72    23.84     154.73      50.11         800 
Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP)- (US$ million)  
     
    733  
 
  26,169 
 
  173,430 
 
  285,366 
 
  946,095 
GDP/Capita(US$)    426   1,098     1,121   5,695    1,183 
Average Annual Inflation 
rate 1  (%)  
 
      5 
 
      9 
 
       11 
 
       4 
 
      11 
Average Annual Interest 
rate 2  (%) 
 
     27 
 
     13.5 
 
       7.5 
 
      5.5 
 
      11 
Current Balance of 
payments. Account deficit (-
)/ Surplus (+) (US$ million) 
 
     -120 
 
    -757 
 
    +1360 
 
 
   -9,900 
 
  +1,043 
Current Balance of payment 
as % of GDP- (%) 
 
    -16 
 
 
      -3 
 
        +1 
 
        -4 
 
   +10 
External Debt 
 (US$ million) 
 
   36.19 
 
    180 
 
     1,188 
 
      5263 
 
    18,779 
External debt as % of GDP- 
(%) 
 
       5 
  
        1 
 
         1 
 
          2 
 
       2 
Percent of population on < 
US$ 2 per day (extreme 
poverty) (%) 
 
      34 
 
       11 
 
         64 
 
         8 
 
     51 
Percent of population on < 
US$ 4 per day (low income) 
(%) 
 
     61 
 
       22 
 
       83 
 
      26 
 
    73 
Gini  coefficient 3 
 
     0.47      0.43      0.43     0.58   0.52 
Life expectancy (males and 
females)- (years)4 
 
     56 
 
     57 
 
      48 
 
      51 
 
    52 
Notes: 1 Inflation is measured as the average annual change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) in 2009/10. 
             2 Interest rate is defined as the average annual commercial bank lending rate in 2009/10. 
             3 The Gini coefficient (index) is a measure of income disparity. The closer the gini coefficient is to 1, the greater the variation between the rich and poor. 
                   4  On average female life expectancy in the sub-Sahara African countries listed in this table is about 4 years more than for their male counterparts.  
In the Gambia female life expectancy currently averages around 58 years and 54 years for males. 
Sources: World Bank (2010); Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2009); International Monetary Fund (2010). 
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Table 2:                                                 Gambia’s Financial Services Sector 2009/10 
This table outlines the main features of Gambia’s financial services sector. 
    Number Current key Regulation Minimum capital 
requirement 
Concentrated Market 
Commercial Banks          111 Gambia Financial Institutions Act 
(2003);Central Bank Act (2006) 
 
D 300,000 – D60 million 
(US$ 11,000 – US$ 2.22 
million) 
        Yes 
Insurance companies          122 Gambia Insurance Act (2003) 
 
D 15 million (US$ 55,600)         No 
MFIs: 
                    Rural : 
                    Urban:         
 
753 
  54 
         80 
Gambia Central Bank Act (2006) D 3000 – 1 million (US$ 
11,000 – 37,000)5 
       Yes 
 
MFI financial statistics: 
Average size of micro- loan per borrower  US$ 35 per borrower 
Total value of micro- loans outstanding US$ 8 million approx. 
Average size of micro- savings per saver US$ 70 per saver 
Total value of micro –savings US$ 6million approx. 
Average loan length  2-3 years 
Typical loan use Mainly business venture but some personal loans (e.g. for medical or educational 
expenses) permitted 
Savings-Loan ratio 2 : 1 approx (low savings mobilization) 
Notes: 1. Includes four (4) foreign owned and one (1) Islamic bank. The three main domestic-owned banks account for 85% of   local loans and 95% of local deposits. Most branches are based in the capital-                              
 Banjul. 
            2. Includes one pure life insurer and one Islamic (takaful) insurer. Remainder write exclusively or mainly (90% of annual  written premiums),non- life insurance business (the majority of which is in 
 property and motor vehicle Insurance).Most  insurers are small (i.e. annual new premiums < US$ 2million) and are 100% domestically -owned. All insurers are joint - stock-owned companies. 
            3. Rural MFIs mainly comprise small savings and credit associations (SACAs) (i.e., forms of cooperative structures) which have < 50 members based in a  defined geographical location (e.g.  a village). 
 Under Central Bank rules SACAs should not issue loans when liquid assets fall  below 15% of loan liabilities. Typically loans for SACAs  are on average of low monetary value ( < US$ 50). 
            4. The largest 5 MFIs account for 90% of micro loans and 75% of micro savings by value. Roughly 70% of the value of micro- credit and 60% of micro savings are accounted for by the two largest MFIs – 
 Reliance (a bank affiliate established in 2006) and the Gambia Women’s Finance Association (GAWFA) established in 1987.These two MFIs operate in both  urban and rural locations and have an 
 average loan per borrower of US$ 75 to US$120 more than  twice the average value of loan to borrower ratio of Gambia MFIs a whole. 
            5. Minimum capital requirements for SACAs = D300 (US$ 111) rising to D300,000 (US$ 11,111) after 3 years; National credit unions = D 1,000,000 (US$ 370,400) and MFI  subsidiaries of fiduciary 
 financial institutions (FFIs) (e.g. ,   commercial banks) = D 60million  (US$ 2.22million).Capital adequacy levels for all Gambian financial institutions have  been raised substantially following the 
 2008 global economic crisis. 
 
Source: Research Data 
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Table 3:                                                Organizational Cases Studied 
 
 This table presents the key organizational characteristics of the three Gambia-based MFIs investigated during the study. 
 
                                            MFI   
 Gambian Credit Union      Gambian Bank  Nigerian Insurer 
Corporate Status  Main Company Main Company Subsidiary 
 
Ownership Mutual Locally owned-multiple 
shareholders 
 100% owned by Nigerian parent  
 
Annual turnover US$ 6-10m US$ 10-20m US$ 0-5m 
 
Local market size Medium Large- medium Small 
 
Length of operations Established Established New Entrant 
 
Current Business Savings & loans Savings ,loans & Investments Savings, loans ,Investments & 
Insurance 
 
Micro-Insurance Not- yet Not-yet Not yet- but group engaged in 
micro-insurance in Nigeria. 
 
Micro-insurance  
Partner 
Not yet Discussions ongoing with Dutch 
insurer (AEGON) 
Yes- group companies 
 
 
Strengths - Established and growing micro-
credit client base. 
- Good credit vetting systems. 
- Low loan default rates. 
- Established local brand. 
- Diversified portfolio of business. 
- Professional finance staff. 
- International links. 
 
-Can draw on expertise (e.g., 
actuarial) from parent company. 
- Experience of micro-credit & 
micro-insurance in Nigeria. 
 
Weaknesses - Lack of micro-insurance expertise. 
- Lacks large scale 
- Lack of micro-insurance expertise. 
- Experienced bad loans recently. 
- Lacks local knowledge. 
- Yet to build up local clientele. 
Source: Research Data 
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Table 4:                          Organizational Attributes for Micro-lending and Micro-insurance. 
This table presents the attributes of the three MFIs in resolving the information asymmetry problems and transaction costs of micro-                                                                                              
lending and micro- insurance. 
 
                                                  MFI   
 Gambian Credit Union     Gambian Bank     Nigerian Bancassurer 
Organizational Form Local mutual Local stock Company Overseas-owned subsidiary 
Agency costs Potentially Low 
e.g. 
 Precautionary mgt. 
 Borrowers are also savers. 
 Relatively small medium  
scale 
           
 
Potentially Medium –high 
e.g.  
 Interests of borrowers and 
savers at risk from 
managers/shareholders 
short-termism (no market 
for corporate control). 
 Existing non-micro clients 
at risk if micro-loans ‘go 
bad’. 
Potentially High 
e.g.  
 Lack of local knowledge 
increases agency costs of 
debt. 
 Shareholders’ interests (in 
Nigeria) substantially 
divergent from local 
borrower/saver interests. 
Transaction costs Potentially Low 
e.g. 
 Comparative advantage in 
micro- credit (core 
business) 
 Local knowledge. 
 Simple business model. 
Potentially High. 
e.g.  
 Will need to invest in 
micro-credit rating systems. 
 Increased risk may increase 
costs of micro-loans. 
Potentially High 
e.g. 
 Need to invest in 
distribution and promotion 
(search costs high). 
 Need to tailor products to 
local needs and 
requirements. 
 
Adverse selection Potentially Low 
e.g. 
 Prospective members 
vetted. 
 Members must save for > 1 
yr before borrowing. 
 Most members from local  
groups/associations. 
 Credit union will control 
distribution.  
 
 
  Potentially High 
  e.g.  
 Credit vetting (screening) at 
individual level. 
 Rush to gain market share 
may increase lending risk. 
 Mode of distribution 
unclear (may need local 
agents.) 
  Potentially High 
  e.g.  
 Credit vetting (screening) 
mainly at individual level. 
 Rush to gain market share 
may increase lending risk. 
 Mode of distribution unclear 
(may need local agents.) 
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Moral Hazard Potentially Low 
e.g. 
 Trust relationships will 
reduce the risk of fraud. 
  Potentially Medium –High 
  e.g.  
 Will need to monitor loan 
use. 
 Will need to monitor cost 
effectiveness of 
distribution. 
  Potentially Medium –High 
  e.g.  
 Will need to monitor loan 
use. 
 Will need to monitor cost 
effectiveness of distribution. 
Benefits of Micro-Insurance Potentially Significant 
e.g. 
 Can reduce the need for 
loan loss provisions and so 
boost period earnings. 
 Increase savings rates and 
reduce borrowing rates. 
 Help increase lending 
capacity. 
  Potentially Significant 
  e.g.  
 Can reduce loan loss 
provisions and so increase 
earnings (and managerial 
bonuses). 
 Risk of failure to repay loan 
passed to insurer. 
 
  Potentially Significant 
  e.g.  
 Can complement existing 
micro-insurance portfolios 
in Nigeria. 
 Can reduce loan loss 
provisions and so increase 
earnings (and managerial 
bonuses). 
Key issues  Lack of insurance expertise 
and actuarial systems. 
 Insurance partner needed. 
 Lack of insurance expertise 
and actuarial systems. 
 Need to convince 
prospective insurance 
partner controls are in 
place and appropriate. 
 Expanding micro-insurance 
/micro-lending locally. 
 Will micro -credit /micro-
insurance products designed 
for another country fit 
locally? 
Source: Research Data 
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Table 5:               Product-Market Attributes for Micro-Credit and Micro-Insurance: Views of MFI Managers 
 
This table outlines the product-market characteristics that MFI managers consider important for Micro-lending and Micro-insurance products to be 
successful in promoting sustainable business development and local economic growth. 
 
Product-Market Attribute                        Key Criteria 
Design  Must be simple and unambiguous. 
 Must fit local social and cultural features (e.g. religious compatibility) 
 Terms must be clear. 
Risk  Systems of search screening and monitoring need to be effective. 
 Risk transfer e.g. via micro insurance – Are all relevant risks covered? 
Are all risks properly priced? 
Distribution  Must be cost effective. 
 Must limit risk of adverse selection and moral hazard. 
Repayments  Must be cost effective and cost-efficient. 
 Must be regular. 
 Loan defaults need to be monitored. 
 Credit risk transferred (e.g. via micro-insurance). 
Purpose  Must be clear. 
 Must be potentially beneficial economically. 
 
Support  Help and advice on micro-credit/micro-insurance. 
 Office staff must have empathy with the financial needs of low income 
clients. 
Audit and Control  Micro-lending/Micro-insurance contracts need to be regularly and 
independently monitored. 
 Are controls adequate to minimize the risk of moral hazard (fraud)? 
 
Financial Performance  Are the micro-loans/micro-insurance products profitable and 
sustainable? 
 Are scale economies being achieved? 
Market Trends  Must have good local market research to identify current and future 
business opportunities. 
 Consider partnerships with other (e.g. insurance) organisations. 
 Need good regulatory and infrastructural systems (e.g. from Central 
Bank) to facilitate future growth. 
Source: Research Data 
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Figure 1:                                              Schematic Representation of Research Findings 
 
This schematic relates the key propositions and their reasoning behind the future growth and development of micro-credit and micro-insurance identified in the 
study.   
 
  PROPOSITION                                                                                REASONING                                                                                     OUTCOME 
   
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Research Data 
 
Proposition 1 
Mutual/co-operative 
form +size (scale) + 
diversity.  
Proposition 3 
Geographical 
distribution + 
gender. 
Alleviates financial 
and moral burden of 
dependents 
Proposition 2 
Customer + 
product-market 
knowledge. 
Proposition 4 
Islamic Faith 
Spatial monitoring 
and control 
efficiencies. 
Targeted and 
flexible products. 
Risk assessment, 
monitoring and 
efficient 
diversification.  
 Micro-credit / 
micro-insurance 
growth and 
development. 
